新建本科院校趋同性更名的动力机制研究

对362所新建高校的更名情况进行统计,发现354所有更名经历,趋同性更名现象突显.从组织社会学视角出发,从效率机制、合法性机制和社会网络机制来解释我国新建本科院校趋同性更名的动力机制,并指出新建高校趋同性更名具有一定的合理性.     

管理团队认知能力、行为整合对决策效果的影响机制研究

现有文献在研究团队决策效果的影响因素时,大部分关注年龄、学历等因素,较少关注非人口统计学特征。根据现有研究结果构建团队认知能力与决策效果的关系模型,利用结构方程模型进行实证研究并指出:团队认知能力的两要素能提升团队决策效果;团队行为整合被看作是团队运作过程的核心,对决策效果产生一定的正向作用,即团队的行为整合程度越高,其决策效果越好;验证行为整合在团队认知能力与决策效果之间具有中介作用。旨为丰富高阶理论、揭示认知能力对决策效果的作用提供借鉴。     

多层供应链外包模式的选择及其协调

本文研究由两个原始设备制造企业（品牌企业）、一个代工企业和一个供应商组成的多层供应链的外包模式选择问题。应用主从博弈和纳什博弈理论，当一个原始设备制造企业的外包模式给定后，通过对不同外包模型求解比较，给出了后跟进的原始设备制造企业外包模式的最优选择策略。研究发现：后跟进的原始设备制造企业最优策略应采取与前一个原始设备制造企业相同的外包策略。针对最优外包策略，还设计了使供应链达到协调的二部定价契约机制，提高了外包供应链的竞争力。     

产品服务供应链的“双重收益共享”合作机制

产品与服务融合缓解了"供需错位"矛盾，使得产品服务供应链探索成为"供给侧结构性改革"下供需结构性匹配的重要路径。本文刻画产品服务视角下供应链组织结构的本质特征，构建产品服务供应链合作模型，探讨合作机制下"帕累托改进"区间存在性，揭示合作机制对产品服务供应链效率的作用机理。核心研究发现：供应链多元化组织结构加剧收益分配冲突，并导致服务规模与供应链效率"倒挂"现象，而合作机制下"双重收益共享"合作模型能提升产品服务供应链效率。     

健全党员能进能出机制问题研究

中国共产党的党员能进能出机制，是党在领导中国革命、建设和改革开放的历程中形成和建立起来的，是我们党健康发展的重要条件。《中国共产党发展党员工作细则》更是首次提出慎重均衡发展中共党员。但目前，一些地方的做法与当前党员队伍建设面临的新形势、新情况还存在不相适应的地方，仍然存在党员入口把关不严、党员教育流于形式、党员监督管理虚化弱化、不合格党员处置相对偏软等问题。为此，我们应当从严把入口、强化监管、畅通出口等方面着手，健全党员队伍的进出口机制，保持党的先进性和纯洁性，增强党组织的战斗力。     

劳动的社会价值测度研究

当今，知识和信息技术的价值化和产业化使得一般人类劳动出现了体力劳动和脑力劳动的分化，且有不同的价值体现，故马克思提出的简单劳动和复杂劳动需要重新定义，将体力劳动定义为简单劳动，脑力劳动定义为复杂劳动。简单劳动是一次耗费，一次凝结并物化到劳动产品的价值中，而复杂劳动是整体或连续性的凝结到知识及与知识相关的产品中。简单劳动和复杂劳动的价值测度模型表明：在完美市场状态下，如果简单劳动的社会劳动生产率提高，那么复杂劳动者的价值也会相应提高。据此，我国要建立健全劳动力市场，就要注重劳动的平等性，对于复杂劳动要建立长效的报酬机制，鼓励创新和社会价值的提升；对于简单劳动要建立充分的竞争机制，给予简单劳动者二次分配后的社会福利与收入补贴。     

工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.     

学前教育体制机制研究的现实图谱和未来走向

学前教育体制机制研究是近年来一个热点、难点论域。运用科学计量可视化软件，结合内容分析，定量与定性相结合的方式系统回视了我国学前教育体制机制研究的实然面貌。并据此省思未来研究应多边集聚研究力量，促进学术共同体开放与融合；多元突破研究范式，促进理实之间对话与共生；多维聚焦研究主题，促进本土情境中问题剖析与解决。     

策略延迟下众筹项目的定价和激励决策

本文研究了投资者的策略延迟行为对众筹项目的定价以及激励决策的影响。策略延迟是指投资者在投资过程中自动按照估值在相应阶段投资，并且部分投资者会刻意延迟投资来搭便车的行为。本文采用了一个两阶段模型来刻画投资者的投资行为，并进一步对比序列到来模式（投资者没有策略延迟）与同时到来模式（投资者有策略延迟）中的贝叶斯均衡。研究结果表明，当发起人采用价格激励的方式提高成功率时，投资者的策略延迟行为可能会影响最优的激励策略。当存在固定目标约束时，如果投资者没有策略延迟行为，发起人应该激励前期投资者，通过弥补他们等待成本的方式提高成功率；反之如果投资者出现策略延迟行为，对项目估值较高的投资者会自动在前期投资并且愿意承受更高的价格，此时发起人应该反过来激励后期投资者。当不存在目标约束时，不论投资者是否有策略延迟行为，发起人都应该始终激励前期投资者以获得更高的成功率以及期望收益。     

Open Data on a Closed Shop? Assessing the potential of transparency initiatives with a focus on efforts to strengthen capacity development support

Despite strong political commitment, actual gains in improving accountability in development co‐operation have been limited. Main reasons for this include the low level of transparency and high number of actors, as well as the limitations of the self‐reported and input‐oriented OECD reporting system. Efforts through the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) and related transparency initiatives are ill‐equipped to change this given their decision to adhere to the same system. This article uses the specific area of support to capacity development to illustrate this. While further disaggregation of reporting on technical co‐operation could respond to a transparency gap, overcoming the accountability gap requires moving beyond promoting ‘supply‐side’ reform and re‐engaging in efforts to promote collective action.